"Four Bits," Ploughshares Vol. 10, Nos. 2 & 3, p. 68.
"Galapagos Revisited," Signature Vol. 21, No. 8 (Aug. 1986).
In contrast to Velleman, Singer (1991, 1994, 2009) understands love tobe fundamentally a matter of bestowing value on the beloved. Tobestow value on another is to project a kind of intrinsicvalue onto him. Indeed, this fact about love is supposed todistinguish love from liking: “Love is an attitude with no clearobjective,” whereas liking is inherently teleological (1991, p.272). As such, there are no standards of correctness for bestowingsuch value, and this is how love differs from other personal attitudeslike gratitude, generosity, and condescension:“love…confers importance no matter what theobject is worth” (p. 273). Consequently, Singer thinks, love isnot an attitude that can be justified in any way.
"Making Contact," Yale Review (Summer, 1988), p. 615.
It is also questionable whether Velleman can even explain theselectivity of love in terms of the “fit” between yourexpressions and my sensitivities. For the relevant sensitivities on mypart are emotional sensitivities: the lowering of my emotionaldefenses and so becoming emotionally vulnerable to you. Thus, I becomevulnerable to the harms (or goods) that befall you and sosympathetically feel your pain (or joy). Such emotions are themselvesassessable for warrant, and now we can ask why my disappointment thatyou lost the race is warranted, but my being disappointed that a merestranger lost would not be warranted. The intuitive answer is that Ilove you but not him. However, this answer is unavailable to Velleman,because he thinks that what makes my response to your dignity that oflove rather than respect is precisely that I feel such emotions, andto appeal to my love in explaining the emotions therefore seemsviciously circular.