1. J. B. Wiesner and H. F. York, 211 (No. 4), 27 (1964).

"There is also an increasing recognition amongcontemporary social scientists that there is a subset ofproblems, such as population, atomic war, environmentalcorruption, and the recovery of a livable urban environment, forwhich there are no current political solutions. The thesis ofthis article is that the common area shared by these two subsetscontains most of the critical problems that threaten the veryexistence of contemporary man." [p. 53]

4. J. H. Fremlin, No.415 (1964), p. 285.

5. A. Smith, (Modern Library, New York, 1937), p. 423.

Believers in this line of thought take the relations that existed between the participants in the classical nineteenth century European balance of power as a model for what a de-ideologized contemporary world would look like. Charles Krauthammer, for example, recently explained that if as a result of Gorbachev's reforms the USSR is shorn of Marxist-Leninist ideology, its behavior will revert to that of nineteenth century imperial Russia.[] While he finds this more reassuring than the threat posed by a communist Russia, he implies that there will still be a substantial degree of competition and conflict in the international system, just as there was say between Russia and Britain or Wilhelmine Germany in the last century. This is, of course, a convenient point of view for people who want to admit that something major is changing in the Soviet Union, but do not want to accept responsibility for recommending the radical policy redirection implicit in such a view. But is it true?

6. W. F. Lloyd, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, England,1833).

In fact, the notion that ideology is a superstructure imposed on a substratum of permanent great power interest is a highly questionable proposition. For the way in which any state defines its national interest is not universal but rests on some kind of prior ideological basis, just as we saw that economic behavior is determined by a prior state of consciousness. In this century, states have adopted highly articulated doctrines with explicit foreign policy agendas legitimizing expansionism, like Marxism-Leninism or National Socialism.

2. G. Hardin,  50,68 (1959), S. von Hoernor, Science 137, 18, (1962).
3. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern,  (Princeton University Press,Princeton, N.J., 1947), p. 11.

11. D. Lack, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, England, 1954).

The only way we can preserve and nurture other and moreprecious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, andthat very soon. "Freedom is the recognition ofnecessity" -- and it is the role of education to reveal toall the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so,can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

13. G. Hardin,  6, 366 (1963).

14. U Thant, No. 168 (February 1968), p. 3.

. I am not using the term "fascism" here in its most precise sense, fully aware of the frequent misuse of this term to denounce anyone to the right of the user. "Fascism" here denotes nay organized ultra nationalist movement with universalistic pretensions - not universalistic with regard to its nationalism, of course, since the latter is exclusive by definition, but with regard to the movement's belief in its right to rule other people. Hence Imperial Japan would qualify as fascist while former strongman Stoessner's Paraguay or Pinochet's Chile would not. Obviously fascist ideologies cannot be universalistic in the sense of Marxism or liberalism, but the structure of the doctrine can be transferred from country to country. ()

19. A. Comfort, (Nelson, London, 1967).

. The internal politics of the Byzantine Empire at the time of Justinian revolved around a conflict between the so-called monophysites and monothelites, who believed that the unity of the Holy Trinity was alternatively one of nature or of will. This conflict corresponded to some extent to one between proponents of different racing teams in the Hippodrome in Byzantium and led to a not insignificant level of political violence. Modern historians would tend to seek the roots of such conflicts in antagonisms between social classes or some other modern economic category, being unwilling to believe that men would kill each other over the nature of the Trinity. ()